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Eastern Neighbourhood: Territorial
Cooperation Implies a Common Energy
Strategy
Vladimir Kolossov and Lisa Van Well
Abstract The chapter outlines the major stakes of this neighbourhood. The Baltic
Sea case study gives an on-the-ground insight of the EU-Russia partnership’s reality.
It shows that Kaliningrad could be a stumbling block to or a touchstone of cooperation
with Russia; that cross-border cooperation is a means to foster ties with Russia; that
people mobility is a key issue in the relationship between the EU and its neighbours–
all neighbours. Last, it shows that intergovernmental institutions include Russia but
not always as efﬁciently as it could. Another case-study focuses on the Black Sea. The
chapter presents innovative research results on city twinning and diplomacy net-
works, so as to compare the relative influence of EU and Russia on this area. The third
case study provides a territorial analysis of the Ukrainian crisis, and explains why the
East of the country is taken in a jaws effect. In conclusion, the chapter insists on the
role of territorial cooperation, and on the need for a genuine European energy policy
because it is indispensable for a genuine partnership between the EU and Russia.
4.1 Stakes
TheEastern neighbourhood (Map 4.1) encompasses the territories from theBaltic area
to theBlack Sea,which areRussia, Belarus,Ukraine andMoldavia. Such a grouping is
motivated by geographical reasons (various historical and cultural links between these
countries, decisive issue of European energy supply security from Russia through
Ukraine, etc.), by historical (USSR) and political reasons (the Eastern Partnership),
and by practical reasons: the data system of these countries remains close due to their
common Soviet past and in all countries two post-Soviet censuses have been already
held which allows time comparisons. Russia is not a country of the ENP, but the
EU-Russia Strategic Partnership is crucial for territorial integration of the Baltic area.
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Map 4.1 The Eastern neighbourhood
Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and the third biggest trading partner. It is
an important supplier of oil and gas to the EU member states, in particular Central
Europe countries. Deeper regional cooperation is essential for ensuring security and
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improving environmental and economic stability of the neighbourhood thanks to a
better EU/Russia partnership. Among the issues is environmental deterioration of
the Baltic Sea, climate change, trafﬁcking in human beings, smuggling of harmful
goods, communicable diseases, illegal immigration and organized crime. Moreover,
through diminishing socio-economic imbalances and inequalities between the EU
countries and western Russia, some of these challenges could be overcome, which
would contribute to the overall stability of the area.
4.1.1 Demographic
The demographic decline is one of the major stakes of this neighbourhood. In
January 2012 the population of Russia was 143 million, unevenly distributed across
the country: 80 % live in the European part of the country while 75 % of its territory
is located eastward of the Urals. Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1993,
the population in Russia hit a historic peak at 149 million; then a 15 year long trend
of population decline began. The main reasons were related to natural population
decrease. In 1994–2009 the population in Russia decreased by 11.9 million due to
natural change, but thanks to immigration surplus the total population decreased by
“only” 6.7 million. Due to several major conflicts before 2002, in particular to the—
often quite compelled—return of displaced people, Chechnya has a positive
demographic trend during the last decade. But most of the regions do experience a
loss in population. Population shrinkage mostly takes place in the most north-
ern and eastern territories, as well as in the most rural regions. The regions located
between St. Petersburg and Moscow suffer from the great attractiveness of these
two metropolises. Russian regions along the border with Ukraine also experience a
shrinking demographic trend.
In Ukraine and Belarus, nearly the entire country experiences negative demo-
graphic trends with the exception of the capital city. In Moldova, the entire country
has declining population ﬁgures, mainly due to emigration to the EU, Russia and
Turkey. Among the countries of the southern Caucasus, only Azerbaijan experi-
ences a demographic growth despite strong out-migration.
Moscow dominates the neighbourhood with more than 11 million inhabitants,
followed by St. Petersburg (5 million), Kiev (2.8 million) and Minsk (1.9 million).
The domestic migrants have their origins in the most rural and peripheral regions
except when there is oil and/or gas. Domestic migrants in Belarus move from the
provincial regions to Minsk. Internal migration is greater than external migration. In
2011 the annual migration turnover of those who moved permanently to another
Russian region or city was 3.1 million, whereas the ofﬁcial (registered) international
migration turnover was only 320,000. The most important destinations of migrants in
Russia were Moscow, St. Petersburg and Krasnodar krai (by the Black sea), whereas
the population of most subjects in the North, East Siberia and the Far East has
decreased rapidly due to outmigration. After the collapse of the USSR, several
shutdowns, degradations and relocations of industries and military activities took
place. Also the fact that several support systems and privileges, such as the so-called
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“northern wage increments”—extra money for working in remote regions with a
harsh climate—were terminated had an impact as many people had taken advantage
of these incentives to work in these regions temporarily for earning money (Map 4.2).
4.1.2 Socio-economic
In terms of gender balance, there is an urban-rural divide in Russia, Belarus and
Ukraine with the capital regions (and St. Petersburg) having a more balanced
Map 4.2 Domestic migration in 2010
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number of males to females of working age. This is especially signiﬁcant in Belarus
where the Minsk metropolitan region stands out as more balanced compared to the
surrounding region which has a lower number of females, perhaps due to the greater
number of females moving to Minsk from the surrounding regions for employment
or education. There is also a North-South divide, whereby the northernmost oblasts
—Murmansk and Arkhangelskaya oblast—have fewer than 90 females per 100
males in working age. In Ingushetia republic in the North Caucasus, the female
population of working age strongly dominates; among the reasons could be the high
mortality rate of men of working age as a consequence of war—but some experts
refer to mistakes made in population census….
Map 4.3 Life expectancy for men, 2010
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Looking at the gender balance of all age groups in 2010 in total, one can notice a
numeral superiority of females over males in the central regions of Russia, with the
exception of Moscovskaya oblast. This could be a sign of a premature mortality
among males (Map 4.3). Despite instability in North Caucasus, life expectancy for
both genders is here the highest, in Ingushetia in particular. In this region with
predominantly rural population, low level of education, strong religious and
socio-cultural traditions there is a higher uncertainty about the mortality rates
(Kvasha and Harjkova 2010). But higher life expectancy could be also attributed to a
lower consumption of alcohol by the Muslim population residing here, as well as in
the Republic of Tatarstan which also stands out in terms of longevity of both genders.
Life expectancy is somewhat higher in the capital cities (Moscow, Minsk and
Kiev) and the St. Petersburg urban area due to a high number of jobs in the tertiary
sector, highest income of the population, economic stability and a better access to
high quality medical service. In many regions of Ukraine, life expectancy is higher
than in Russia, particularly for men. Life expectancy is also higher in the Belorussian
and Ukrainian regions on the EU border, especially when it comes to women.
The North Caucasus region (Chechnya and Dagestan) is characterised by a high
fertility rate which can be explained by strong cultural and religious traditions, and
a low level of education. At the same time there is a lower proportion of the elderly
in these regions and a fairly low share of active population. Besides the North
Caucasus there are only two oblasts in North-East Russia (Republic of
Udmurtia and Republic of Bashkortostan) with a slightly higher share of children
and young. The same goes for Moldova—a high proportion of children and young
people, with a low proportion elderly and active population.
The Murmansk Oblast of Russia has the highest rate of active population while
Belarus (except in the greater Minsk region) and the Ukraine regions have a lower
share. Chechnya and the Moldova are the areas with lowest working populations
and active populations.
We have seen how tricky it is to address the employment issue, due to a high rate
of informal activity (see Sect. 1.3.2). Yet we know that GDP in Russia is centred on
the Moscow and St. Petersburg metropolitan regions. The regions bordering the
Urals eastern edge also have slightly higher GDPs than the regions bordering the EU.
When looking at GDP per capita, the Moscow and St. Petersburg region are still
dominating, but along withMurmansk, Belorod oblast and Tatarstan (one of Russia’s
most economically developed regions). Ukraine as a country was hard hit by the
economic crisis and thus performs worst in GDP per capita, along with Moldova.
4.1.3 Environmental
The Eastern neighbourhood’s countries share a number of common environmental
challenges. Most of them are related to water quality, waste management, hazardous
nuclear namely military activities, industrial pollution, obsolete pesticides, land,
forest and biodiversity management, non-rational and depleting use of natural
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resources, low energy efﬁciency, as well as pollution of the Sea of Azov, the Black
Sea and the Caspian Sea (ENPI 2007) (Table 4.1).
The region’s major environmental problem is related to the consequences of the
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, which continues to pose long-term environ-
mental and health damages to Ukraine, the neighbouring Belarus and Moldova and
Bryansk oblast in Russia.
Belarus and Ukraine were among the most industrialized countries in the former
Soviet Union. Although, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, industrial pro-
duction levels decreased signiﬁcantly, the environmental problems linked to in-
dustrial processes remain. The deposits of industrial waste, obsolete pesticides and
unsustainable mining practices from the past pose serious environmental risks today
(i.e. the regions of Donbas in Ukraine and Soligorsk in Belarus) (ENVSEC 2010).
In Belarus, one third of all pesticides are stored under unsuitable conditions (e.g. at
farms or industrial facilities). Ukraine is home to about 16,800 tons of highly toxic
Table 4.1 Summary of major environmental challenges in the countries of the Eastern
neighbourhood
Belarus Land degradation (wetland areas of Polesie)
Chernobyl disaster consequences
Hazardous industrial sites and polluting facilities
Stockpiles and disposal sites of toxic waste, incl. obsolete pesticides
Defence facilities and activities
European Russia Nuclear-waste and accidents





Land and water body pollution with mineral fertilizers and pesticides
Loss in biodiversity
Excessive use of natural resources
Excessive pollution
Soil erosion
Transnistria Degradation of water resources
Air pollution
Accumulation of solid household and industrial wastes
Reduction of the forest area and illegal cutting of forests
Degradation of land resources
Soil pollution with agrochemicals and pesticides
Ukraine Hazardous and military activities (industrial and mining facilities,
radioactive contamination, hazardous waste)
Nuclear power and waste (Chernobyl)
Obsolete pesticides and industrial pollution
Water management and water scarcity
Land, forest and biodiversity management
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and hazardous rocket fuel component ‘melange’ since 1961; the storage facilities
are no longer safe but the country does not possess the capacity, both ﬁnancial and
technical, to recycle or dispose of the compound in an ecologically sound manner.
Overall, low technological capacity results in higher emission levels, higher waste
volumes from production processes, while insufﬁcient treatment of industrial
wastewater affects the stability of ecosystems.
Military heritage also left its mark on the region—toxic and radioactive material
can be found in all countries of the neighbourhood. The decommissioning of
nuclear submarines and disposal of nuclear waste is an on-going process in
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts, where many of the submarines are still
docked. Moreover, even today pollution at defence sites and facilities, as well as
disposal of obsolete armaments are important issues for Belarus and the Caucasus
region.
When it comes to radioactive and toxic waste, the countries often do not have
suitable infrastructure and available ﬁnancial resources to handle it. In the Republic
of Moldova, for instance, there were about 8000 tons of toxic waste products in
2004 and no available disposal sites to store them.
Poor status of the water environment is another environmental challenge. The
leading causes are weakly developed sewerage systems, industrial discharges and
non-existant or out-dated wastewater treatment plants, but also agricultural pollu-
tion and soil erosion. In the Republic of Moldova, most sources of underground
water do not meet water quality standards due to a high content of chemically
harmful substances, such as fluorine, sulphates and chlorides (ENVSEC 2006). The
pollutants have accumulated in seas with limited water exchange, such as the
Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
– Water quality problems are severe in the Volga Basin in Russia. Volga is
Europe’s longest and among its most polluted rivers, as a result of the cumu-
lative effects of overuse, untreated sewage and heavy industry. Volga’s water is
far beyond the quality norms for drinking water and is unsuitable for ﬁsh
farming or irrigation. The Caspian Sea which receives about 85 % of its
freshwater from the Volga River is dramatically affected (Henry and
Douhovnikoff 2008). The Caspian Sea is an example of excessive chemical
pollution through running rivers (the Volga, Kura and Ural Rivers) and offshore
and onshore oil and gas industry. Underwater oil pipelines which surround
Absheron peninsula and some area of Mangyshlag are also among the sources of
pollution of the Sea. During the Russia-Chechnya war, military waste was
dumped into the sea. Today the Caspian Sea is also polluted by radioactive
waste. The Sea is experiencing a decline in commercial ﬁsh stocks, such as
Caspian sturgeon.
– The nutrients from agricultural, domestic and industrial sources and insufﬁ-
ciently treated sewage waters cause eutrophication and degradation of the
ecosystems in these seas. Water quality of the Black Sea is affected by the
polluted waters of the Dnipro and the Danube rivers which pass through Central
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Europe and the territories of Russia and Belarus before emptying into the Black
Sea. In recent years, chemical pollution by oil and toxic substances has become
a serious trans-boundary problem affecting the Black Sea.
– Exhaustive nature management aimed at fostering economic growth and active
utilisation of aquatic ecosystem services of the Sea of Azov has left irreversible
damages to the ecosystem (Lagutov 2011).
In all countries of the Eastern neighbourhood and in the Caucasus in particular,
land degradation and desertiﬁcation is a serious environmental challenge. Fertile
soils are being exposed to degradation as a result of human activity, reduced
deforestation, unsustainable agricultural practices and mismanagement. The lower
Volga River was degraded beyond repair during the Soviet period. Wind erosion
has affected the more arid parts of the North Caucasus and lower Volga River basin.
In the Republic of Moldova the area of eroded land grows by approximately 0.9 %
each year which results in losses of 26 million tons of fertile soil.
The Eastern neighbourhood comprises about 30 % of the world forest reserves
which act as major sinks of greenhouse gases and play an important role from
climate change mitigation perspective. Yet, illegal logging and corruption represent
a major threat for forestry in the region. Most likely pressure to increase extraction
will grow as the domestic and international demand for lumber grows.
4.2 Baltic Sea Region: Case Study on the EU/Russian
on-the-Ground Partnership
4.2.1 What Delineation?
There is no precise deﬁnition of the boundaries of the BSR. From the geographical
point of view, the BSR comprises the countries which have coastlines on the Baltic
Sea (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and
Russia). Normally, only the northernmost coastal regions of Germany are included
(Hansestadt Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Schleswig-Holstein),
northern Poland (Pomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie, and Zachodnio-Pomorskie)
and some parts of the north-western federal district of Russia (Kaliningrad oblast,
Leningrad oblast and Republic of Karelia). Moreover, the BSR comprises the areas
which are in a drainage basin of the Baltic Sea. So, besides nine coastal states, there
are ﬁve countries in the basin—Belarus, with almost half of its area in the basin, and
smaller parts of Ukraine, Czech Republic and Slovakia draining through Poland,
and very small parts of Norway. The whole drainage area covers 1.7 million square
kilometer, and is home for 85 million people.
Other factors matter when deﬁning the region. Norway is included due to its
strong economic ties with the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea and willingness
to participate in regional cooperation. The deﬁnition of the Region varies across
different institutions and intergovernmental organisations. For instance, if the
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purpose of cooperation is environmental protection of the common water, then it
makes sense to include the territories of Belarus which are in the drainage basin.
The BSR is a highly heterogeneous area in economic, environmental, social and
cultural terms, but at the same time the countries in the region share many common
resources, have strong ties, common development trends and challenges (i.e. Baltic
Sea environmental degradation) (EC 2013).
The Baltic Sea has brought people together for centuries by providing routes for
trade and cultural exchange. In the Middle Ages until the 15th century, nearly a
hundred cities in the BSR belonged to the Hanseatic League—a trading system
which covered most of northern Europe. Economic ties with North-West Russia
have traditionally been strong. Before the revolution in 1917, the St. Petersburg
metropolitan area was a major export market for a number of eastern Finland’s
industries. Moreover, some areas of modern Russian Federation were previously
foreign territories. Part of the Republic of Karelia belonged to Finland, while
Kaliningrad was part of Prussia and, later, the German Reich before the World
War II.
Integrative processes and cooperation in the BSR were hampered by historical
events, including the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, cooperation in the
BSR resumed. Cooperation between the countries increased with further enlarge-
ment of the European Union, ﬁrst Finland and Sweden in 1995 then the Baltic
States and Poland in 2004. Today the BSR continues to beneﬁt from exceptionally
strong economic, social and trading ties in the region (State of the region report
2012). Development of the BSR identity would contribute to regional community
viability and resilience, as well as improve overall understanding and conflict
resolution.
4.2.2 Russia Versus Rest of the BSR
The Nordic countries have a long tradition of strong national and local govern-
ments. The local authorities carry out most of the planning activities sharing the
responsibility with the national level, which is also referred to as the “Nordic
approach”. Cooperation between the administrative levels is well-functioning,
partly due to a good coherence and a high level of trust between all governance
levels. Public participation is a strong element of the Nordic culture, all the more as
these countries have a strong civil society. The situation is quite similar in
Germany, where power is divided between the federal governments and Lander.
On the other hand, the post-communist countries (three Baltic States and Poland)
are lagging behind the Nordic neighbours in the ﬁeld of governance. As young
democracies, the priority in the 1990s was given to more pressing political and
economic reforms, such as establishing an effective representative democracy rather
than fostering public participation. During the last decades these countries made
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signiﬁcant progress towards better governance, largely influenced by the EU
accession process. Requirements for the distribution of EU structural funds have
supported the regional level of governance. Despite the principle of subsidiary
applied in the Baltic States, the challenges for the local governance remain. The
municipalities here have little decision-making authority, few administrative
functions and are lacking ﬁnancial independence (Böhme 2013).
In Russia, local authorities historically have even less power. In the beginning of
the 2000s, a policy of re-centralisation was taken, which diminished the newly
found autonomy of regional actors. The majority of regions were subordinate to the
central government, politically, economically and administratively, which limited
opportunities for the regions to engage in international activities (Ross and
Campbell 2008). In 2003, the Law on Local Governance implied decentralisation.
However, the newly formed local self-governments remain weak and have limited
ﬁnancial independence, and have to focus on implementing activities delegated
from the top. Corruption and the lack of transparency are additional challenges for
the development of good governance.
When it comes to demographic dynamics, the North-South territorial divide is
primarily influenced by diversiﬁed climatic conditions. The BSR consists of a
densely populated southern part and largely uninhabited and sparsely populated
northern part. Connecting the remote rural settlements in the North to the urban
networks and providing sufﬁcient transport infrastructure remains a major challenge
for the development there. The population decline in the northernmost parts of the
region is expected to continue, except in cities (Nordregio 2012).
But, as a whole, population dynamics rather display an East-West divide. The
population in the Baltic States and North-West Russia is declining both in urban
and rural areas due to low fertility and high outmigration. The North-West Russia is
experiencing the sharpest population decline in the region by 0,5 % annually and
has fertility rates below western European averages, except for Kaliningrad oblast
where the demographic situation is fairly good (State of the Region Report 2012;
Sebentsov and Zotova 2013). High emigration rates of the working-age population
from the Baltic States, Poland and the North-West Russia places an even higher
burden on the remaining workforce in these countries. On the contrary, the popu-
lation in the Nordic countries continues to grow due to high birth rates and
immigration (e.g. from the Baltic States).
When it comes to economic dynamics, the East-West disparities are still visible
two decades since the fall of the iron curtain (Map 4.4). GDP per capita in the
western part accounts for more than 120 % of the EU average, whereas it is less
than 50 % in the eastern part. Despite the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the Baltic States
are doing better. Before 2000 the prosperity levels in Norway were more than ﬁve
times higher than in Latvia; today the ratio dropped to three—even if Latvia still
remains one of the poorest countries in the EU.
There are also considerable differences within the north-western Federal District
in Russia itself. The District consists of 11 federal “subjects” including 2 republics,
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Map 4.4 GDP (PPS) per capita. An East-West economic divide, 2009. Source Nordregio
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7 oblasts, 1 federal city and 1 autonomous oblast. It borders with Finland, Poland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus, and has access to the Baltic, White, Barents
and Kara Sea. The area covers 1.6 million square kilometer, which is almost as
much as the catchment area of the Baltic Sea. Leningrad oblast and St. Petersburg
are the fastest growing of all federal subjects in Russia, whereas the Komi Republic
and Murmansk oblast are ranked at the bottom. The economy of the Kaliningrad
oblast can be characterised as fragile and unstable. The economic crisis in 2008 had
a worse impact on the exclave than other federal subjects of the north-western
Federal District.
North-West Russia’s economy is regarded as one of the most dynamic parts of
Russia. Among the strongest industries in the Archangelsk and Karelia regions are
forest, timber and pulp and paper; the fuel industry in Komi, ferrous metals in
Vologda and Murmansk, and chemicals in Novgorod. Basically, EU/Russia trade
shows a core-periphery pattern: the main imports from the EU to Russia are
manufactured goods, services and food; Russia primarily exports raw materials to
the EU.
Trade flows within the BSR are currently exceeding the trade flows outside the
region. The Baltic States and Belarus have the highest shares of trade flows within
the region, followed by the Nordic countries and Poland (Map 4.5). But despite (or
because of) the communist past, the Baltic States and Poland have rapidly reduced
economic ties with Russia. Estonia is increasingly oriented towards the
Scandinavian trade blocks. Latvia and Lithuania are strategically turning to
the western European countries. The unique location of the Baltic States on the
crossroads between eastern and western markets is not fully used today.
Russian participation in the BSR economic integration is mainly limited to
energy and transit projects, with Gazprom being the main investor. There are few
Russian companies established in the EU part of the BSR. Although the volume of
investment by the Swedish, Finnish and other transnational corporations in Russia
is growing, the actual integration of Russian business into the BSR is still rather
weak (Kuznetsov 2012).
Due to the growth of EU-Russia trade, complemented by inefﬁcient procedures
and inadequate infrastructure on the Russian side, long queues of lorries at crossing
points from Finland, Estonia and Latvia have become commonplace. Simplifying
the customs legislation and improving infrastructure in Russia will help avoid
similar problems in the future (EUSBSR Action Plan 2013). The perspectives of the
development of Kaliningrad seaport are not that bright, primarily due to high
competition with the neighbouring ports of Klaipeda (Lithuania) and Gdansk
(Poland), and to barriers related to customs and border crossing procedures which
hinder the formation of a strong transport cluster in the exclave (Map 4.6).
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4.2.3 Kaliningrad: Stumbling Block or Touchstone
of the Cooperation with Russia?
The Kaliningrad oblast is a special case due to its exclave status and geographical
isolation from mainland Russia. The oblast is surrounded by EU countries, which
influences the mindset of the residents. They often mention that they have a strong
connection to the BSR and have developed a sense of a separate identity which is
Map 4.5 Trade between the Baltic Sea Region countries, 2006. Source Schmitt and Dubois
(2008), Nordregio
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Map 4.6 Border crossings and E-roads in the BSR. Source ESPON Temo, 2014, Nordregio
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very close to Europeans (OSW 2012). There is a strong interest from the residents
of the exclave in strengthening people-to-people contacts with the neighbouring
European countries, cooperating in the ﬁeld of culture, education, environment and
social development issues.
Historically, Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) and its surroundings had been part
of Prussia since the early 13th century. After World War II it was annexed by the
USSR; millions of German residents were expelled, and the “Kaliningrad Oblast”—
one of the smallest subjects of the Russian Federation—was predominantly used as
a military base because it is one of the rare Russian seaports on the Baltic free of ice
year-round. Until 1991, Kaliningrad was a “closed” area, impossible for foreigners
to enter because of its strategic importance for Soviet defence. In 1991, Kaliningrad
became an exclave of the no longer socialist Russian Federation, cut off from its
motherland by Lithuanian land, or Polish territory.
The city is among the greatest sources of pollution in the entire Baltic Sea basin.
Due to weak development of sewage treatment plants in the urban centres and
villages of Kaliningrad oblast, communal wastewater mostly goes untreated into the
Neman and Pergola rivers. The lack of adequate waste management systems in
Kaliningrad oblast represents a threat to the quality of groundwater.
Energy security is an important issue for Kaliningrad: in the event of a gas
conflict between Russia and its neighbours, the oblast may experience the shortages
of raw materials. This was the case in 2004 as a consequence of Moscow cutting off
its supplies to Belarus. In 2011, Kaliningrad oblast produced enough power to meet
its demand for electricity due to recently completed construction of (gas) heat and
power plant. Since December 2011 the region’s energy grid has been connected
with the rest of Russia through the energy lines running through Lithuania. But the
prices of gas and petroleum products in Kaliningrad oblast are in general higher
than average Russian prices. Since 2009, Moscow has been interested in the con-
struction of a nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad oblast. As long as its planned
output is higher than the area’s demand for energy, some of the energy would be
exported, mainly to the EU member states. Construction of the Baltic nuclear power
plant would, on the one hand, contribute to establishing a closer relation between
EU and Kaliningrad oblast. On the other hand, along with environmental concerns,
the construction of the nuclear power plant would increase EU dependency on the
energy supply from Russia, and thus reduce the energy security of Poland and the
Baltic States.
Both federal and regional authorities in Kaliningrad have long been interested in
fostering the production and export orientation of the economy of Kaliningrad. For
this purpose, and in order to attract foreign investments, a free customs zone regime
in the framework of a Special economic zone (SEZ) was established here. The SEZ
grants exception from the customs duties and custom fees to all goods produced in
the SEZ if companies—large companies and not small or middle-sized ones—add
30 % of added value locally and export to foreign countries or to mainland Russia. In
general, there are also no import taxes in Kaliningrad with the exception of some
categories of goods.
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The economy of Kaliningrad oblast is oriented towards openness and enhance-
ment of foreign economic activities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the hopes
were great for Kaliningrad to become the “Singapore” of Russia. The exclave has a
vast trade deﬁcit due to its underdeveloped economy and the fact that it is used
mainly as a gateway to mainland Russia for foreign goods. With introduction of the
SEZ regime, Kaliningrad was expected to develop exports to neighbouring EU
countries. However, instead of expanding exports, imports grew on a mass scale.
Imports account for over 90 % of Kaliningrad’s foreign trade: components for the
assembly of cars and TV sets, household chemical products, food products, foot-
wear, clothes and furniture. The key suppliers of goods to Kaliningrad are Germany,
China, South Korea and Slovakia (Rogoża et al. 2012). In 2010 about 7 % of all EU
exports to Russia went through Kaliningrad oblast. Consumer goods and the items
that are processed and/or assembled in the region and then sold in the other regions
of Russia constitute the largest share of the imported items.
In spite of the considerable beneﬁts of the SEZ regime, the investment climate
and business environment in general are far from being good in Kaliningrad. Even
though business activities, including foreign investments in the region, have
increased over the last decade, the full potential of the region as a gateway to
Russian, Baltic and wider European markets has not been used. Instability of federal
tax and tariff legislation, as well as uncertainty about the SEZ regime in Kaliningrad
are among the barriers to attracting foreign investments. Other barriers include the
lack of adequate competences at the regional level and, typical for Russia as a
whole, excessive bureaucracy, corruption and a poor legal culture. Moreover, there
are no cheap flights to and from Kaliningrad to the outside world, as well as no
trains. Isolation of the market from mainland Russia and higher business costs
related to that (i.e. costs of energy, transit and imports), are amongst additional
drawbacks; as a consequence, most of big businesses who want to implant in Russia
go to other SEZs “inside” Russia. For the Oblast itself, the ﬁnancing of the SEZ has
been a high burden on the budget, combined with high tax losses. Lastly, the SEZ
will close in 2016 because of Russia’s joining of the WTO and the incompatibility
of some of its provisions with WTO rules.
4.2.4 Cross-Border Cooperation as a (Fragile) Means
to Foster Ties with Russia
Border areas often share common problems. At the same time, geographical
proximity to the border can present opportunities. This has been the case for the
forestry sector in eastern Finland and the neighbouring Republic of Karelia, which
has beneﬁted from a proximity to the border due to lower transport costs and direct
economic contacts. The border municipalities and regions in North-West Russia
(particularly the Leningrad region and Vyborg municipal district) have also bene-
ﬁted from the proximity to the border and the development of Russia’s oil and gas
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transport infrastructure. The on-going investments to develop Leningrad region’s
harbours strengthens this geographical asset.
The cross-border cooperation between the EU and North-West Russia has been
quite successful, especially the bilateral relations between Russia and Finland—in
spite of the historical antagonism between the two countries. Until the economic
crisis in 2008 bilateral trade and investments grew signiﬁcantly, with Leningrad
region being the main gateway. During the years 2006–2010, investment in the
Leningrad region by the Finnish companies accounted for about 16 % of total
Finish investments in the Russian Federation. During the last decade several
cross-border entrepreneurial networks emerged between south-eastern Finland and
the Leningrad region (Zimin 2013).
At the same time, emerging economic ties and cultural cooperation in the
EU-Russia borderlands are highly sensitive to the market fluctuations and unsteady
institutional framework, including the border regime. Looking at the forestry sector as
an example, opening up of the Russian border for trade in the early 1990s positively
influenced the development of markets for rawmaterials in the forestry sector. During
this period, Finnish imports of round wood from Russia grew substantially, which
enabled Finland to expand the production industry by processing timber. In 2007
Russia introduced export duties for timber to encourage domestic processing of raw
materials, which resulted in a sharp decline in trade of round wood to Finland.
In case of Kaliningrad oblast, the years 1999–2003 were the most successful for
cross-border cooperation. It was carried out between the non-governmental
organisations and the regional authorities. However, enlargement of the EU in
2004 brought closer attention of the Russian central government to the region.
As Richard et al. (2015) state, “although the economic and social conditions
exist for the rapid integration of the Kaliningrad Oblast in the Baltic region, one
must admit that cross-border cooperation has hardly developed (…), in a particular
geopolitical context where Kaliningrad has become a double periphery of Russia
and the EU”. According to them, and along with the tense geopolitical context
between the EU and Russia, the rising but still poor development of exchanges with
the surrounding territories of Poland and Lithuania is also caused by the persistence
of social representations in local public opinion that hamper cross-border relations.
The Kaliningrad region could be a model of interaction between Russia and the EU,
they say. However, the present situation suggests that this area “may sink into a
double distrust atmosphere, lead to the militarisation of border regions and the
limitation of cross border cooperation”.
4.2.5 Commonalities for Regional Integration: Transport,
Environment, Tourism
Signiﬁcant deﬁcits in the quality and efﬁciency of transport infrastructure can be
observed when travelling from West to East (Baltic States-Russia direction), such
as fragmented motorway sections and a relative lack of electriﬁed double-track
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railway lines, which hinder mobility of goods and persons despite recent
improvement. In addition, institutional obstacles at the border crossings impede a
better integration of North-West Russia and Belarus with their EU neighbours.
The Baltic Sea is among the busiest shipping routes in the world with steadily
increasing trafﬁc volumes. Maritime industries, such as ﬁsheries, ship building,
port-related services and supply chains, are important industries and have an
important contribution to the regional integration and development. Moreover,
marine and coastal areas are used for recreational activities and tourism. The Baltic
Sea waters are also used for production and transport of fossil (e.g. Nordstream) and
renewable energy.
Development of industries and trade, intensiﬁcation of agriculture and other
anthropogenic activities have contributed to the environmental degradation of the
sea. The Baltic Sea is highly vulnerable to pollution due to a limited water exchange
and low oxygen volumes. Eutrophication, contamination by hazardous substances
and loss of biodiversity are the main challenges to the ecosystem today. Climate
change also presents a serious concern, both through indirect (e.g. changed land
use, water runoff) and direct effects (e.g. increase in water temperature). Addressing
these challenges requires joined efforts taken by all countries in the catchment area.
Green growth is an important topic for the prosperity of the entire Baltic Sea
macro-region. European countries have, overall, more expertise when it comes to
deploying sustainable solutions and promoting green growth. According to the
association for economic interaction of the subjects of the North-West region of the
Russian Federation (Association North-West) the environmental protection will be
one of the perspective directions for cooperation between the Russian Federation
and the EU in the BSR (BSR 2012).
The major problems in the North-West Russia are high levels of water and air
pollution, the lack of environmental infrastructure, the lack of regulations which
would force businesses to respect the natural environment, and a low environmental
awareness level of the population. Among the most acute problems is a poor quality
or lack of waste water treatment systems and poor waste management. Improving
the environmental situation through promoting the implementation of projects of
construction and modernisation of municipal sewage treatment plants, sewers,
enterprises for the sorting and recycling of waste were among the priorities of the
Russian presidency of the CBSS (2012–2013). With EU aid a sewage treatment
plant was built in Gusev (Kaliningrad oblast), and a few others have been mod-
ernised. Kaliningrad’s efforts to reduce the amount of waste entering the Baltic Sea
were also supported by the federal programme for developing Kaliningrad oblast
until 2015. The Swedish international development co-operation agency (SIDA)
also contributed over US$17 million in 2003–2007 for the construction and mod-
ernisation of water and sewage infrastructure and sewage treatment plants in
Kaliningrad oblast. Further developments in this ﬁeld are needed to contribute to
pollution prevention in the Baltic Sea. The actions should also include consulta-
tions, experience exchange and trainings of representatives of stock-raising and
poultry farms in the BSR.
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Tourism development and promotion of macro-regional tourist products (de-
velopment of joint international tourist programmes together with neighbouring
European countries are among the objectives in the Russian Strategy of social and
economic development of the North-West Federal District set up in 2011. In
addition, creating a network of recreational clusters based on sustainable tourism
development was among the priorities of the Russian presidency of the CBSS.
Tourism development also coincides with the objective of the EUSBSR, which is to
foster Baltic Sea regional identity. Therefore promoting sustainability in tourism,
together with cultural and historical heritage, could be among the focus areas for
joint Russian-EU international tourist programmes in future.
4.2.6 The Key Issue of People Mobility
In the Baltic States, regional integration is of high importance for many individuals
who have relatives, friends and cultural ties with Russia and Belarus and vice versa.
Simplifying a visa regime could be an important step towards integration. Let us see
what the starting point is.
Despite a varying degree of success in developing cross-border cooperation with
the authorities and regional actors in North-West Russia, human mobility in its
various forms is at stake. Since the early 1990s and the following expansion of the
EU the number of Russians crossing the border has increased substantially. In
Finland, Russian nationals account for about three quarters of the total number of
border crossings today. The most common reason is day trips or shopping, which
make a valuable contribution to the Finnish economy. Besides that,
Russian-speaking residents are now the largest group speaking a foreign language
in Finland, followed by Estonian-speakers. Moreover, Finland became an important
tourist destination, several thousands of Russians come there yearly for seasonal or
temporary jobs.
Residents of Kaliningrad tend to travel to EU countries considerably more often
than the residents of other Russian regions. The data from 2011 shows that around
215,000 visas to the EU countries (out of 941,500 residents of the exclave) were
issued. Since the region is dependent on external supplies (from Russia and abroad),
goods and services in neighbouring countries become more attractive and compet-
itive: not only shopping centres, but also resorts and clinics in Poland and Lithuania.
Gradually, these countries are becoming a point of reference in terms of living
standards, including the quality and prices of goods and services. The average cost of
a food basket in Gdansk is approximately 20 % lower than in Kaliningrad, while the
cost of gasoline is much higher in Gdansk than in Kaliningrad.
Conversely, a Russian entry visa is required to travel to Russia for all EU
nationals no matter what the purpose of a visit is. Business, private, humanitarian,
work and student visas are issued for a period of up to 3 months. In the case of
business and humanitarian visas it is possible to obtain a multiple entry visa, which
is valid for 1 year. In most cases a visa invitation from a receiving party
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(e.g. company, relatives, friends, educational institutions) from Russia is needed.
Tourist visas are valid for up to 30 days and can only be used for one entry.
The Russian Federation visa-free regime for up to 90 days was valid for citizens
of Ukraine and Moldavia. Citizens of Belarus do not require a visa and can stay in
Russia for an unlimited period. There are few possibilities for a visa-free entry to
Russia. Stateless persons who were former citizens of USSR and now residing in
Estonia and Latvia (holders of alien and non-citizen passports in Estonia and Latvia
respectively) can enter Russia without a visa for a period of 90 days. Since 2009,
cruise ship passengers travelling to the BSR ports of Kaliningrad, Vyborg and St.
Petersburg can stay in Russia for up to 72 h without a visa on condition that the
tours are booked through the travel agencies authorised in Russia.
When travelling to the Kaliningrad region, citizens of Schengen states, UK and
Japan can obtain a 72 h tourist visa at the border check points of Bagrationovsk,
Mamonovo andKhrabrovoAirport, if traveling through an approved travel agency. In
all other cases a Russian visa cannot be obtained on arrival but only through the
Russian Consulates and Embassies. A bilateral local border trafﬁc agreement between
Kaliningrad and neighbouring Polish regions was signed in 2011, which represents
signiﬁcant progress in visa-free talks. From 2012, the residents of the Russian exclave
who use local border trafﬁc are allowed to stay in Poland for a period of thirty days (but
no longer than ninety days within every six months). In 2013, the Russian ministry of
Culture proposed a draft bill aiming to introduce a 72-h visa-free transit for foreigners
from 20 countries (including the BSR countries Finland, Sweden, Germany and
Poland) on condition that they travel with a Russian airline carrier. Among the eligible
airports included in the proposal are those located in the BSR—Pulkovo in
St. Petersburg and Khrabrovo in Kaliningrad. Making Kaliningrad a pilot region for
establishing visa-free movement into the entire EU has been discussed for years.
4.2.7 Intergovernmental Institutions Include Russia
but not Always Efﬁciently
There are a number of intergovernmental organisations established in the BSR,
which have been dealing with regional development issues for more than twenty
years and of which Russia is an active member. So, a solid basis for development of
cooperation has existed for decades. The existence of these structures can be seen as
an important driver for neighbourhood integration.
Adopted in 2009, The European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region
(EUSBSR) is the ﬁrst macro-regional strategy in Europe. It involves eight EU
member states around the Baltic Sea and promotes cooperation with Russia and
Belarus. The thematic pillars are: environmentally safe region, prosperous region,
accessible and attractive region, and safe and secure region. Russian actors can be
involved in the EUSBSR flagship projects as associated partners, but the Strategy
was elaborated without full-fledged participation of Russia and the country is
excluded from the decision making process.
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In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Cross-border coop-
eration (CBC) is a key priority of the ENPI. Russia is a beneﬁciary of four CBC
programmes co-funded by both the EU and the Russian Federation (220 million €
for the period 2007–2013).
VASAB (Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea) is an intergovernmental
network of eleven countries of the BSR including Russia and Belarus which was
established in 1992. It promotes cooperation in the ﬁeld of spatial planning and
development.
The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is an overall political forum for
regional inter-governmental cooperation established in 1992. Members of the
Council are the eleven states of the BSR, as well as the European Commission. The
Council provides a unique regional platform for cooperation between EU member
states and the Russian Federation. The long-term CBSS priorities are economic
development, environment, education and culture, energy and civil security. Since
2013 the CBSS Project Support Facility (PSF) has provided co-ﬁnancing to the
development and implementation of Baltic Sea macro-regional cooperation pro-
jects. PSF allows the involvement of Russian actors on an equal footing.
Initiated in 1999, the Northern Dimension (ND) policy plays a vital role in
overall cooperation in the BSR, especially when it comes to developing
cross-border cooperation with Russia. ND envisages equal participation of EU
member states, the Russian Federation, Norway and Iceland. The ND partnerships
provide a good platform for projects of macro-regional signiﬁcance in culture,
environment (including nuclear safety), public health, transport and logistics.
However, some difﬁculties occurred, namely failure to meet many of these projects’
co-ﬁnancing requirements by the Russian side (for instance for modernising the
water-and-sewerage networks in Kaliningrad). Among the projects that are usually
implemented successfully are so-called ‘soft’ projects in the ﬁeld of youth exchange
and training events.
In sum, Russia is involved in the BSR intergovernmental cooperation via the
Northern Dimension and to some extent via the CBSS and VASAB. But without
the active participation of Russia in the EUSBSR, coherent sustainable develop-
ment of the BSR cannot be achieved.
4.3 Black Sea: Case Study on the Local Ties with EU
and Russia
4.3.1 City Twinning: Balanced Partnerships with the EU
and Immediate Neighbours—Especially Russia
It is relevant to address the international cooperation at a local level, and observe if
the cities that border the Black Sea are keen to collaborate together. A database has
been compiled for 102 cities located in the Black Sea Region and the country of the
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cities with which they concluded twining agreements. 207 partnerships—a third of
the total—have been made with Black Sea countries (i.e. countries bordering the
Sea), especially with Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey. Another third have been made
with EU countries (except Bulgaria and Romania), especially with Italy, Germany
and Greece.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of partnerships were
established with EU countries. Since the 1990s, more were undertaken with other
Black Sea countries, the USA and Asian countries. Recently, in the 2000s, new
areas for twinning partnerships emerged, such as with the European Mediterranean
neighbourhood and Western Balkans.
In the post-Soviet states, partnerships are often with other parts of the former
Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In Romania and Bulgaria, the partner
cities are mainly located in the EU; from a local point of view also, this membership
really translates into further integration with the EU (Map 4.7).
Map 4.7 Twinning of the Black Sea cities: regional breakdown
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4.3.2 Diplomacy Networks of the Black Sea Countries:
Rather with the EU or with Russia?
Influence can also be measured through embassy networks. The ITAN project
compiled the addresses of resident and non-resident embassies in the region. The
database indicates with which countries the Black Sea countries have a resident
embassy and in which capital cities they do not have these embassies. In the latter
case, diplomatic relations are supported by a corresponding embassy situated in
another country, which is, as a consequence, competent for more than one state. For
example, Iceland only has 11 embassies in the area but has diplomatic relations
with 43 countries. This means that Iceland’s diplomatic relations with 32 countries
are made through the competence of a “non-resident embassy”. For its relations
with Italy, Iceland uses the Icelandic embassy in Paris; the Parisian embassy is said
to be the corresponding embassy of the non-resident embassy in Italy.
In the Black Sea Region, Moscow and Ankara are among the cities with the
highest number of embassies; Turkey and Russia inherit long histories as states and
empires. According to our database, 100 % of the countries that have diplomatic
relations in Russia do have an embassy located in Moscow. On the contrary, Tbilisi
and Chisinau are narrow diplomatic places in matter of number of embassies. In
general, only the most powerful countries in the world can afford to build and
maintain embassies even in small states. This means that many countries in the
world that have diplomatic relations with Georgia do not have embassies in this
country; the question is: where, then, is their non-resident embassy in charge of
their diplomatic links with Georgia located? Answering this question displays a
picture of the diplomatic dependence of the Black Sea countries. Indeed, most of
the Black Sea countries, which are middle-sized or small-sized diplomatic places,
and have a lot of non-resident embassies: Turkey and Russia host a great number of
non-resident embassies for Georgia; Romania and Ukraine host a great number of
non-resident embassies for Moldova—whereas Germany and Russia host a great
number of non-resident embassies for Romania. Black Sea capital cities can also
host embassies competent for countries outside the region: Bucharest and Soﬁa host
a lot of embassies competent also for Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Albania.
Map 4.8 gives the resulting picture for the diplomatic links as a whole with the
Black Sea countries. A large part of the diplomatic dependence of the Black Sea
countries, especially Ukraine, Bulgaria and Georgia, is on Moscow; Bucharest and
Ankara are secondary centres. The other main hosting city of Black Sea
non-resident embassies are EU capital cities, especially Berlin, Roma and Vienna.
The Black Sea region is a fragmented area. Initiatives to create some integration
at a supranational level remain shy. The interests of the different Black Sea
countries are too divergent for rapid development of such initiatives. Economic and
demographic trends are also quite divergent; they divide the area between Turkey,
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which is experiencing rapid growth, the other Black Sea countries with weak
economic growth (except Russia), low fertility rates and large diplomatic and
economic dependence on EU members or Russia. The European Union is the main
trade partner of the Black Sea countries and the main partner for city twinning,
diplomatic links or port trafﬁc; but this polarising role is rather declining, whereas
Turkey and Russia’s influence are on the rise.
Map 4.8 Diplomatic links in the Black Sea region. Location of the resident embassies not directly
housed in the Black Sea countries
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4.4 Ukraine: Case Study on the Territorial Divide
and Cohesion of a Contested Country
The recent turmoil in Ukraine shows how important it is to consider the evolution
of territorial patterns in political decision-making, in particular regarding the EU
neighbourhood. This section describes the main features of recent territorial
development in Ukraine at the regional scale (oblast).1 Though it does not allow
following detailed changes, such analysis underlines the major trends of the country
dynamics—for example, a sharp increase of the economic role of the capital city
typical for most post-socialist States. Ironically, the on-going crisis in Ukraine,
which raises the issue of national cohesion, takes place after a period of strong
reinforcement of the capital city. The growing gap in wealth between the capital and
other regions is one of the factors undermining the nation-building of modern
Ukraine.
4.4.1 Ukraine in Its Macro-Regional Context: A Fragile
Interface Between Europe and Russia
Ukraine plays a key role in the delivery of Russian energy resources to Europe:
60 % of the Russian gas consumed in Europe transits through Ukraine. In the last
decade, Russia has developed alternative routes: the North Stream (under the Baltic
Sea directly to Germany, see Map 4.9) and the Blue Stream to Turkey. The South
Stream project under the Black Sea to Balkan Europe is under construction.
Both the EU and Russia tried to convince the former Ukrainian leadership of the
advantages of economic integration with them. The EU suggested signing the ENP
Association agreement while Russia insisted that Ukraine joins the Eurasian
Custom Union under Moscow’s leadership. Each side argued that the maintenance
of close economic relations was incompatible with integration with the other partner
and thus considered it as a zero-sum game which triggered the current crisis in
November 2013, when Russia requested Ukraine join the Eurasian Custom Union
before signing the Association agreement during the Oriental Partnership Summit.
The EU and Russia were the main partners of Ukraine as regards to foreign
trade, and its most important sources of foreign direct investments. They are also the
main destinations of Ukrainian emigration. The EU provides Ukraine with the
largest part of foreign aid. The territorial distribution of flight connections reflected
this situation. In relation to population, Russia, as trade partner (import + export),
was much more important for Ukraine than the EU member states. The legacy of
the common Soviet past clearly showed in the distribution of exports: Russia was a
1The analysis partly derives from debates that took place during the international conference of the
CIST held in Paris on March 27- 28th 2014. See in particular the debates with Jacques Sapir on
http://www.gis-cist.fr/cist2014-compte-rendu/.
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much more important foreign consumer of Ukrainian goods than the EU. Figure 4.1
shows that the EU share in Ukrainian trade has been rising in the 1990s but is
declining since the 2000s (Teurtrie 2012).
In the last decade, the Ukraine economy has shown successive indicators of
weakness. The gap between Russian economic growth and that of Ukraine has been
rising since 2003, because Ukrainian productive system has not been modernising
quickly enough and needed massive investments. Since 2005 Ukrainian trade deﬁcit
has been deepening and since 2006 Ukrainian public debt has been rapidly
increasing. As a result, Ukraine’s path is decreasingly resembles that of an emerging
economy; the country stands as one of the poorest area of the Europe Eastern
neighbourhood, along with Georgia and its breakaway parts—Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Western part of Ukraine shows a particularly low level of development.
The contrast is obvious compared to Russia, and even to Belarus which has been
doing somewhat better than Ukraine since the 2000s. Still, the situation in eastern
Ukraine, the most industrialised and urbanised region, has been more favourable,
partly because of its rapid depopulation (GRP per inhabitant rises when population
declines). This development was in striking contrast with the progress of most
regions of Turkey and of the neighbouring Russian Krasnodar krai.
Map 4.9 The geo-economic context of Ukraine, 2013
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4.4.2 Nation-Building, Declining Regional Disparities,
Rising Concerns
Another striking feature of Ukraine during the last decade is the rising regional
issue. Ukraine has basically only existed in its present boundaries since World War
Two. Before, western Ukraine had never been a part of a single State with other
regions. Crimea was included in Ukraine territory even later (1954). Besides, unlike
core Ukrainian areas, south-eastern and southern regions have been populated
relatively recently by Ukrainian and Russian settlers—since the late 17th century
and especially in the period of industrialisation in the late 19th century. Therefore
regional cultural, economic and political disparities became one of the problems for
the Ukrainian independent State.
Moreover, during the last decade territorial disparities have been deepening:
– the West still remains much less urbanised; its agriculture remains an important
share in GRP. The region suffers from under-equipment and is lagging behind
national income average,
– the East possessed a strong industrial basis and concentrates the largest cities; it
was richer than the national average,
Fig. 4.1 The external trade of Ukraine: the declining role of Europe (in % of Ukrainian trade,
goods + services, values). Source Ukrstat
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– the centre of the country has an intermediate position, except for the city of Kiev
and its oblast which are the most dynamic territories, with numerous civil
servants and a set of business services.
Ukraine’s population has been steadily declining; nowadays it has 46 million
people (its mid-1960s level), compared to 53 million in 1993. Reasons for this
decline are both natural decrease, and emigration almost equally distributed
between EU countries and Russia. During the 2000s, no single region in the country
experienced demographic growth, except the city of Kiev. Depopulation is par-
ticularly strong in the East (regions of Donetsk, Lugansk) and also in the oblasts of
Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava and Kirovograd. This process is closely related to the
ageing of population. In the East and Crimea, the share of children under 16
dropped under 13 %. Most oblasts have a negative migratory balance. The few
exceptions include primarily Kiev and its outskirts, and to a much lesser extent
Odessa, Kharkov, and Crimea with its sea resorts and the city of Sebastopol which,
as a Russian naval base, has always had a speciﬁc status.
Regional income disparities are very high: in 2010 income in the City of Kiev
was more than double the national average. The East runs second. The lowest
incomes are in the West. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the eastern
industrial regions wages have been severely declining compared to the national
average. On the contrary, during the modern nation-state building era, the relative
average amount increased in the West and especially in Kiev.
The East remained the main source of Ukrainian exports: exports per capita
value was particularly high in the regions of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk, which
provided more than a third of the country exported goods, mainly iron ore, rolled
steel, basic chemicals and fertilizers. The city of Kiev also appears as an important
exporter since it hosts the headquarters of many important companies whose pro-
duction units are located in other regions (regionalised data on foreign trade are
always questionable); but the imports of Kiev are even larger, thus its trade balance
is highly negative. Therefore, Ukraine earned most of its foreign trade revenues
thanks to industrial exports from its eastern part. CIS countries, especially Russia,
were its main trade partners, particularly when considering that 8 % of foreign trade,
which mostly consists of “undocumented” natural gas coming from Russia was not
regionally distributed by national statistics. Ukraine and Russia have for centuries
belonged to the same single economic space, and economic links inherited from
Soviet times were still strong, especially in the East.
4.4.3 Conclusion: A Jaws Effect in the East
Map 4.10 provides a synthetic typology:
– The city of Kiev beneﬁtted from developments in the post-Soviet period thanks
to relatively high incomes, the rapid growth of wages and consumption mani-
fested in the highly negative balance of foreign trade. This explains a signiﬁcant
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increase in the capital population—a striking contrast compared to the rest of the
country—thanks to migration from all other regions, in other words a typical
nation-building pattern.
– The position of the West slightly improved but only in relative terms. It remains
less urbanised and poorer than the country as the whole, although its demo-
graphic situation is better and wages have been rising.
– The central part of the country is close to national average by all indicators.
– As for the East, since the end of Soviet times, it highly contributed to the
modern national-building era: it remained the main source of export income for
the country; it gathered the most important taxpayers since per capita incomes
and salaries were signiﬁcantly higher than national average (even if the informal
economy is lower than in the rest of the country where revenues are therefore
under-estimated); it sended its youth to the capital region, suffered from
depopulation and had a negative net balance of migration. All of this happens in
the context of an ageing population, sluggish economic growth and declining
wages compared to the rest of the country. The East kept strong economic
relations with Russia, particularly in the engineering and manufacturing sectors
that depended on exports to Russia: eastern regions had a positive trade balance
with Russia, and many large factories belonged to Russian companies. Such a
Map 4.10 Ukrainian regional typology, ca 2012
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situation, together with a high ratio of “ethnic” Russians (Map 4.11) and fam-
ilies with a mixed Russian-Ukrainian background, and with the domination of
the Russian language in everyday people to people communications, provoked
the dissatisfaction of many citizens with the arrival to power in February 2014 of
politicians from the West calling for a break with Russia. The joint action of
Russian authorities sealed the deepening of the Ukrainian nation-building crisis.
4.5 Strategic Synthesis: Role of Territorial Cooperation,
Key Russia and Energy Issues
Among the important topics for cooperation between the EU and its eastern
neighbours is tackling the environmental challenges of the Baltic Sea. As the Baltic
Sea itself is a special eco-system, one that is highly threatened by several envi-
ronmental hazards, it is vital that all countries around the sea, including those
located in the catchment area (Belarus), participate in order to combat the
Map 4.11 Russian “belonging feeling”, at the beginning of the 2000s. Source Survey elaborated
by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine
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consequences of trans-boundary pollution and preserve the sea as a common
resource. This topic is currently being addressed in the EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region.
The factors that are worsening the degree of territorial integration between the
EU and the Eastern neighbourhood include underdeveloped physical infrastructure
connecting the East and the West, disparities in access to ICT between the countries
(although the disparities are shrinking rather quickly), governance differences (i.e.
the room for manoeuvre that regions have to cooperate independently of central
government), as well as institutional and organizational bottlenecks (e.g. long
border crossing time into the Schengen zone). Due to inefﬁcient procedures, long
queues of lorries at crossing points from Finland, Estonia and Latvia have been
usual. Simplifying the customs legislation and border crossing procedures and
coordinating the development of transport axes between the Eastern neighbourhood
and the EU territory would help to avoid similar problems. Development of some
large scale transport projects (Via/Rail Baltica—IX transport corridor, and Via
Hanseatica) are expected to play an important role in increasing the accessibility of
the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. However, their role in the railway connections
with Russia and Belarus will be limited by the use of standard European gauge.
Another worsening factor is the deteriorating relationship between the EU and
Russia. Given the remaining ties—cultural, economic, political, diplomatic—be-
tween Russia and the EU’s eastern neighbours, any renewal of the EU’s eastern
partnership will rely on an improved strategic relationship with Russia.
Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and third biggest trading partner, and a key
supplier of oil and gas to EU member states. In 2013, the share of EU in Russia’s
foreign trade accounted for 56 %. But this share is declining because the turnover
with other countries—primarily, China, but also Turkey and South Korea, etc.—is
growing faster: China became Russia’s main foreign trade partner instead of
Germany. From the perspective of the geographical distribution of FDI, Russia also
remains much closer to Europe than to other regions of the world: EU countries
account for three quarters of accumulated FDI. Moreover, in the 2000s the EU share
was growing—yet investments from Cyprus consist in fact of a repatriation of
Russian capital.
When it comes to tourism, the number of Russian citizens visiting foreign
countries before the crisis was rapidly increasing. Though their main destinations
were the countries of so called cheap tourism (Turkey and Egypt), EU countries
also proﬁted of the growing number of Russian tourists, in particular Greece and
Finland (the third major destination in 2013), Spain, Germany and Italy. At the
same time, the growth of foreign tourism in Russia was modest because of the lack
of an adequate infrastructure and because of an unfavourable image of the country.
Lastly, West Europe is the main destination of regular flights from/to Russia.
When it comes to territorial development strategies on a macro-regional level,
the major ones are VASAB Long-Term Perspective for the Territorial Development
of the Baltic Sea Region and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR).
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Likewise, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region also brings together both EU
states and countries in the Eastern neighbourhood around use of the Danube as a
common resource. Russia has also shown interest in macro-regional strategic
planning. In 2011 Russia adopted the Strategy on social and economic development
of the North-West Federal District (NWFD) until 2020, which also aims at planning
large macro-regional units. Today, Russia is involved in the implementation of the
Action Plan of the Strategy via the Northern Dimension and, to some extent, via the
activities of the Council of The Baltic Sea States and VASAB, but this is insufﬁ-
cient: the exclusion of Russia in the developing process of the EUSBSR is a
signiﬁcant deﬁcit of the Strategy and a step back in the integration process.
Among the good practices of territorial development strategies is the introduc-
tion of a bilateral local border trafﬁc agreement between northern Poland and
Kaliningrad in 2012, which facilitated the crossing of the Polish-Russian border by
residents of the entire Kaliningrad region. This agreement is seen as an important
step towards creating a legal basis facilitating movement of people between the two
countries. It plays an important role in facilitating direct social, cultural, tourist and
other people-to-people contacts, which is a precondition for increased regional
integration. The countries also established a regular cooperation in ﬁghting inter-
national organized crime and border security.
In the case of sector speciﬁc cooperation, the bilateral relationship between the
eastern Finland and the Republic of Karelia in Russia in the forestry sector can be
emphasized as a good example of a well-functioning cross-border partnership.
As to other relevant actors outside the international policy arena, the develop-
ment of closer ties is supported by regional authorities, business actors, NGOs and
academia. The Baltic University Programme (BUP) can be highlighted as a unique
regional university network with about 225 universities in the 14 countries across
the Baltic Sea region, including Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Among the ﬁndings
of the ESPON “TERCO” project was that the probability of successful territorial
cooperation with more tangible outcomes is higher if NGOs and local and regional
governments, rather than national governments, initiate the cooperation (Euroreg
2012).
However, due to the Ukrainian crisis, the changing geopolitical atmosphere is
expected to cause a change in the quality of relations between the EU and the
Eastern neighbourhood and lead to their deterioration. The Ukrainian crisis reveals
major stakes on a higher scale: Western Ukraine is increasing its orientation to the
EU, whereas Russia is strengthening its economic ties with Asian and Central Asian
countries. In the current situation energy issues become in the centre of attention
once again. A European Energy policy is an indispensable prerequisite for a gen-
uine partnership between the EU member states and Russia, instead of the current
dispersed member states’ gas agreements with Russia, though Russian and even a
number of Western experts express justiﬁed objections against its implementation.
This is the overarching condition for better cooperation on all scales between the
EU and the Eastern neighbours (Fig. 4.2).
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